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Introduction
In recent years there has been increasing interest in the construction and implementation of sharing rules for environments with externalities. Such environments encompass a large array of economic scenarios and arise whenever the benefits or costs to a group of agents depend on the coalitions formed by agents outside the group. Prominent examples are a market with several competing firms, countries negotiating on trade agreements and union-firm bargaining in a given industry.
One fruitful approach has been to proceed axiomatically and propose sharing methods (known as values) based on a collection of desirable properties. Some of the proposals extend the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b) , which is defined for games with no externalities. 1 This is the direction taken in the papers by Myerson (1977) , Bolger (1989) Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2007) (that we will refer to as MP W ). These proposals satisfy the properties (axioms) of efficiency, anonymity (symmetry), linearity, and the "null" player property that states that players which have no effect on the outcome should neither receive nor pay anything. The particular definitions of these properties, at times together with some additional axioms, lead to different extensions of the Shapley value.
In MP W we strengthen the symmetry property by proposing the "strong symmetry axiom" capturing the idea that players with "identical power" should receive the same outcome. We show that this axiom is equivalent to adopting an "average approach" to the problem of sharing. This approach is quite intuitive: it yields to a player in a game with externalities the Shapley value of an average game with no externalities. The average game is obtained from the original game by assigning to each coalition its (weighted) average payoff. The average approach generates an attractive family of sharing methods (see Section 2 for further details). For example, by including an additional property MP W (2007) derived a unique sharing method belonging to the family of averaging methods.
This value corresponds to the one proposed, but not axiomatized, by Feldman (1996) . 1 Similarly, de Clippel and Serrano (forthcoming), rather than extend the Shapley value, focus on the implications of the marginality axiom underlying the Shapley value, for games with externalities.
McQuillin (2006) also uses axioms to characterize a value that simultaneously extends the Shapley value to games with externalities and to situations where there is a prior coalition structure.
In games without externalities, another useful approach to find sharing methods has been to take a constructive point of view. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) showed how the Shapley value can be derived through the potential approach. 2 Harsanyi (1959) used the notion of dividends accruing to a player from the various coalitions he could participate in and showed that their sum yields the Shapley value. Maschler (1982) generalized this approach to a procedure through which the payoffs accruing to agents are still given by the Shapley value.
In this paper we adopt the constructive approach both to justify the family of average values and to generate new sharing methods. We first define the dividends for all possible partition-coalition pairs (in contrast to the no-externalities case the dividends of a coalition may depend on the partition it belongs to) and then proceed to allocate them among the players. We show that the sum of dividends a player gets yields the average value defined in MP W .
This approach can be easily adopted to generate non-symmetric values, possibly capturing players's characteristics external to the environment. Hence we provide a new family of weighted Shapley value for games with externalities and show that each one coincides with the weighted Shapley value of the average game.
We then augment the cooperative approach by implementing the weighted values for games with externalities via a bidding mechanism that is based on the mechanisms appearing in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) and Macho-Stadler, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2006) (we will refer to this paper as MP W b).
In the next section, we present the environment and the average value.
In Section 3,
we analyze the case of dividends and in Section 4 we define the weighted Shapley value.
In Section 5, we propose a mechanism to implement the weighted Shapley value.
The environment and the average approach
Environments with externalities are best described as games in partition function form that were first introduced by Thrall and Lucas (1963). We denote by N = {1, ..., n} the set of players. An embedded coalition is a pair (S, P ), where S ⊆ N is a coalition and P 3 S is a partition of N. An embedded coalition specifies the coalition as well as the organization of the rest of players. Also, we denote by P the set of all partitions of N and by ECL = {(S, P ) | S ∈ P, P ∈ P} the set of embedded coalitions.
Let (N, v) be a game in partition function form, where the characteristic function v : ECL → R associates a real number with each embedded coalition. For each (S, P ) ∈ ECL, we interpret v(S, P ) as the worth of coalition S when the players are organized according to the partition P. The partition P is always taken to include the empty set ∅ and, for notational convenience, when describing a partition we only list the non-empty coalitions. The characteristic function satisfies v(∅, P ) = 0.
A sharing method, or a value, is a mapping ϕ which associates with every game (N, v)
. A value determines the payoffs for every player in the game and, by definition, it is always efficient since the value of the grand coalition is shared among the players. In all the paper, it is assumed that forming the grand coalition is the most efficient way of organizing the society and thus all the players end up together. Formally, v(N, {N}) ≥ P S∈P v(S, P ) for every partition P ∈ P. To introduce the family of values proposed in MP W using the average approach we present first the axioms that characterize it.
We say that player i ∈ N is a null player in the game (N, v) if v(S, P ) = v(S 0 , P 0 ) for every (S, P ) ∈ ECL and for any embedded coalition (S 0 , P 0 ) that can be obtained from (S, P ) by changing the affiliation of player i.
The addition of two games (N, v) and (N, v 0 ) is defined as the game (N, v + v 0 ) where
Similarly, given the game (N, v) and the scalar λ ∈ R, the game (N, λv) is defined by (λv)(S, P ) ≡ λv(S, P ) for all
For any permutation σ of N, the σ permutation of the game (N, v), denoted by (N, σv)
is defined by (σv)(S, P ) ≡ v(σS, σP ) for all (S, P ) ∈ ECL.
The extension of Shapley (1953b)'s basic axioms proposed in MP W for values in environments with externalities are:
1. Linearity: A value ϕ satisfies the linearity axiom if:
1.2. For any game (N, v) and any scalar λ ∈ R, ϕ(N, λv) = λϕ(N, v).
Symmetry:
A value ϕ satisfies the symmetry axiom if for any permutation σ of N, ϕ(N, σv) = σϕ(N, v).
Null player:
A value ϕ satisfies the null player axiom if for any player i which is a null player in the game (N, v), ϕ i (N, v) = 0.
In games with no externalities where the worth of any coalition S does not depend on the organization of the other players, i.e., v(S, P ) = v(S, P 0 ) for every S ⊆ N and (S, P ), (S, P 0 ) ∈ ECL, these three basic axioms characterize a unique value (Shapley, 1953b) . For expositional clarity, we denote by (N, b v) a game with no externalities, where
R is a function that gives the worth of each coalition. The Shapley value φ can be written as:
where we have denoted by β i (S, n) the following numbers:
In games with externalities, the previous axioms are satisfied by a large set of values.
In MP W we propose an extension of the notion of symmetry also to the externalities created. As required by the symmetry axiom, symmetry is a property of anonymity: the payoff of a player is only derived from his influence on the worth of the coalitions, it does not depend on his "name". The strong symmetry axiom strengthens the symmetry axiom by requiring that exchanging the names of the players inducing the same externality should also not affect the payoff of any player. To formally state the axiom, we denote by σ S,P P , with P 3 S, a new partition with S ∈ σ S,P P resulting from a permutation of the set N\S.
Given an embedded coalition (S, P ), the σ S,P permutation of the game (N, v) denoted by (N, σ S,P v) is defined by (σ S,P v)(S, P ) = v(S, σ S,P P ), (σ S,P v)(S, σ S,P P ) = v(S, P ), and
2'. A value ϕ satisfies the strong symmetry axiom if:
for any (S, P ) ∈ ECL and for any permutation σ S,P , ϕ(N, σ S,P v) = ϕ(N, v).
As proven in MP W any value ϕ satisfying linearity and null player axioms also satisfies the strong symmetry axiom if and only if it can be constructed through the "average approach".
The average approach consists of, first constructing an average game (N, b v α ) associated with the partition function game (N, v), by assigning to each coalition S ⊆ N the average
We refer to α(S, P ) as the "coefficient" of the partition P in the computation of the value of coalition S ∈ P . 
Moreover, due to the symmetry and null player axioms the coefficients must be symmetric (i.e., α(S, P ) only depends on the sizes of the coalitions in P ) and satisfy the following condition:
for all i ∈ S and for all (S, P ) ∈ ECL with |S| > 1.
There are still a variety of values satisfying the requirements of linearity, strong symmetry, and null player, each value corresponding to a different averaging method.
In MP W we add a "similar influence axiom" to characterize a value with coefficients
(see also Feldman, 1996) . Other recent proposals also satisfy the average approach. The externality-free value studied and characterized by Pham Do and Norde (2007) and de Clippel and Serrano (forthcoming) corresponds to the vector of coefficients α(S, P ) = 1 if P = n S, {j} j∈N\S o and α(S, P ) = 0 otherwise; that is, only the partition where players outside S form singleton coalitions is taken into account. 4 On the other extreme, in his extension of the Shapley value McQuillin (2006) ends up proposing a value that corresponds to α(S, P ) = 1 if P = {S, N\S} and α(S, P ) = 0 otherwise; that is, the only important partition is the one where players outside S form a single coalition. where P (S) = |{(S, Q)/(S, Q) ∈ ECL}|. 5 We denote by ϕ α the value constructed through the average approach with a vector of coefficients α. The analysis developed in the next sections can be applied to any value ϕ α , in particular to those previously discussed.
Dividends in games with externalities
In this section we interpret any value ϕ α in terms of sharing of dividends, in the spirit of the Harsanyi (1959) dividends for games in characteristic function form.
In games with no externalities, the Shapley value can be characterized as the value that distributes the so-called Harsanyi dividends of the game equally among the players in the corresponding coalitions. Harsanyi (1959) assumed that every coalition would negotiate a vector of "dividends" such that the sum of all coalitions's dividends vectors would be a feasible allocation for the grand coalition. Therefore, the dividends of a coalition S are what is left after all proper subcoalitions of S have received their corresponding dividends.
More formally, the dividends ∆ v (S) of a game in characteristic form (N, b v) are defined recursively: Harsanyi (1959) showed that all the equal shares of the dividends a player is entitled to sum up to his 4 The main contribution of de Clippel and Serrano (forthcoming) is the analysis of the marginality principle in games with externalities. 5 The values proposed by Myerson (1977) and Bolger (1989) can not be constructed through the average approach. Some of the values proposed by Dutta, Ehlers and Kar (2008) can also be constructed to the average approach while others can not.
Shapley value:
In a similar spirit, consider a game with externalities (N, v) and a system of coefficients α. We can obtain the dividends of a coalition S when it is part of the partition P taking into account that the dividends of subcoalitions of S should matter only in proportion to its corresponding coefficients. Formally, we can also define the dividends inductively as follows:
Theorem 1 provides an interpretation of any value ϕ α in terms of dividends. Therefore, it is a result that can be applied, in particular, to the values studied by Feldman (1996) and 
Theorem 1
The value ϕ α can be written as follows:
Proof. We denote by ∆ v α (S) the dividends of the average game (N, b v α ) associated with the (N, v). We prove by induction over the number of elements of S that
The proof is immediate when S = ∅ (and it is also immediate when |S| = 1). Assuming that the expression holds for any coalition R with |R| < |S|, we can write
Since φ is the Shapley value of the (characteristic form game ) b v α , we can write
in terms of sum of dividends:
Maschler (1982) showed that the sharing method based on dividends was a special case of a procedure where a given sequence of coalitions sequentially claim their worth. At each step the worth of one coalition is equally shared by its members. The process then generates a new game where the worth of each coalition containing the sharing coalition is reduced by the worth of the sharing coalition, whereas the worth of other coalitions is not altered. The next coalition in the sequence then proceeds to share its worth. This process ends when all coalitions arrive at zero worth. It was then shown that this process must end, and the sum of payoffs accruing to each player is his Shapley value. The value ϕ α can be arrived at via these more general procedures as well if the proportion α(S, P ) of the dividend associated with each embedded coalition (S, P ) is assigned to each player i ∈ S and the coefficient α(S, P ) is also used to reduce the worth of each coalition containing S.
Weighted Shapley values in games with externalities
In some economic applications, the symmetry axiom can be challenged. Formally, for a given vector of weights w ∈ R n , with w i > 0 for i ∈ N, the corresponding weighted Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) φ w associates with every game (N, b v) a vector in R n that satisfies:
where w S ≡ P i∈S w i . The Shapley value φ i (N, b v) is arrived at when all the weights w i are equal.
We can proceed in a similar way to obtain non-symmetric values for games with externalities. We define, for a given vector of weights w ∈ R n , with w i > 0 for i ∈ N, (and for each vector of factors α) a weighted Shapley value for games with externalities:
It follows easily that there is a relationship between the weighted Shapley value for games with externalities that we have defined through the dividends and the weighted Shapley value of the corresponding average game (N, b v α ). We state this result in the next proposition:
The value ϕ αw can be written as follows:
Proof. We write the value φ w :
following the proof of Theorem 1. Therefore, 
Implementation of weighted Shapley values in games with externalities
The value ϕ αw (N, v) can be implemented via bidding mechanisms in the same spirit as the ones that appear in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) and MP W b), for any system of non-negative coefficients, i.e., a(S, P ) ≥ 0 for all (S, P ) ∈ ECL that satisfy (3).
The implementation is carried out for environments that can be characterized either via negative or via positive externalities, and slightly different mechanisms are used for each environment. Positive and negative externalities are defined as follows.
Definition 1
The game (N, v) has negative externalities if v(S, P ) ≥ v(S, P 0 ) for every P, P 0 , when each element in P 0 is given by a union of elements in P .
Definition 2
The game (N, v) has positive externalities if v(S, P ) ≤ v(S, P 0 ) for every P, P 0 , when each element in P 0 is given by a union of elements in P .
In both types of environments it must be the case that the departure of a single player from a coalition results in efficiency losses. This is a mild requirement usually referred to as zero-monotonicity in games without externalities. It can be extended in several ways to games with externalities, one extension appropriate for the case of negative externalities is given by:
for every (S, P ) ∈ ECL and every i ∈ S .
Zero-monotonicity-A requires that the addition of a singleton player to a coalition is always beneficial, considering that the organization of the other players does not change.
For environments with negative externalities, we implement the value ϕ αw (N, v) via the mechanism M − (α, w) which modifies the M − (α) mechanism appearing in MP W b.
Environments with positive externalities can be similarly analyzed by modifying the mechanism M + (α) in the same way.
The mechanism M − (α, w) can be informally described as follows:
At each round, there is a set of "insiders" S and a set of "outsiders" N \S. At the first round, the set of insiders is N. Each round is composed of two stages; the first stage is played among the insiders, the second one, if reached, is played among the outsiders.
In the insiders stage, the players in S select a proposer among themselves through a multibidding procedure. Each player's bid is weighted according to the vector w so that the influence of a player's bid in the multibidding procedure is proportional to the player's weight. Once a proposer is chosen, he pays the bids he made and then makes a proposal to the other members in S on the sharing of the (expected) benefits if they stay together (i.e., if they form the coalition S). If the proposal is rejected, the proposer joins the set of outsiders and the remaining insiders go to the next round. If the proposal is accepted, S forms and the organization of the outsiders is determined in the outsiders stage. Note that in the case where S = N the outsiders' stage is redundant.
At the outsiders stage, the set of players is N\S, those agents whose proposals have been rejected at previous rounds of the mechanism. First, a "candidate partition" of N, including S, is randomly selected, where the probability of selecting a particular partition is the coefficient α(S, P ) associated with this partition by the averaging system α. Second, the members of each coalition in such a partition, other than S, play a game that determines whether the candidate partition (or some finer partition) is the final organization. This phase is constructed to encourage the proposer in the insiders stage to make acceptable proposals. The formal description of the mechanism M − (α, w) follows.
The mechanism M − (α, w)
The mechanism M − (α, w) proceeds in rounds. Each round is characterized by a coalition S ⊆ N, S 6 = ∅. At the first round of the mechanism, S = N. 
O(S) : Outsiders stage
A partition P , with S ∈ P , is chosen with probability α(S, P ). Denote by T s+1 the coalition in P containing the last rejected proposer, γ s+1 .
6 A proposer β(T ) is randomly chosen for every T ∈ P \S with |T | > 1, the only restriction is that β(T s+1 ) 6 = γ s+1 , when
The agents in each such coalition T play the game G(T ), described below.
∈ R to every i ∈ T \β(T ).
G(T ).2:
The agents in T \β(T ), sequentially, either accept or reject the proposal.
When an agent δ(T ) rejects it, then the proposal is rejected. In this case, all the players in T \δ(T ) play the game G(T \δ(T )) with β(T ) as the proposer and player δ(T ) stays as a 6 If S = N , then there is no γ s+1 , and the grand coalition N is chosen with probability 1.
singleton. Otherwise, the proposal is accepted, the coalition T is formed, and β(T ) pays
to every i ∈ T \β(T ).
Following these games we obtain a partition P (S) consisting of S, the coalitions resulting from the G(T ) games, and the singleton coalitions in P .
Outcome.
We denote by S * the coalition of insiders which is formed and P * ≡ P (S * ) the final
The outcomes for the set of outsiders, N\S * = {γ m } m=s * +1,...,n , are given as follows:
The final outcome of player γ m , for m = s
* , where S m = N\ {γ m , ..., γ n } . Otherwise, denote by T m the coalition in P * containing agent γ m and by β(T m ) the proposer in that coalition. The
Theorem 2 characterizes the equilibrium outcome of this mechanism:
Theorem 2 If the game (N, v) has negative externalities and it is strictly zero-monotonic-A, then the mechanism M − (α, w) implements in SP E the value ϕ αw (N, v).
Proof. We first prove that every SP E of M − (α, w) leads to a payoff vector coinciding with ϕ αw (N, v).
Denote by φ w j (S, b v α ) the weighted Shapley value of player j ∈ S in the game with no
We fix the size n of the set of players N and proceed by induction over the number s Given that the probability that partition P 3 {j} is chosen, is α({j}, P ), the expected payoff for j from this stage (I({j})) on is given by: X P 3{j}
α({j}, P )v({j}, P ) = b v({j}) = φ w j ({j}, b v α ).
We now assume the induction property holds for any set R with a number of players smaller than k and prove it also holds for any set S with k players. Claim 2. In any SPE the aggregate bids are all zero, i.e., B i = 0 for all i ∈ S.
Moreover, any player i ∈ S is indifferent with respect to the identity of the proposer. Hence, the induction property holds for S.
This (taking the case where S = N) shows that every SP E payoff of M − (α, w) is ϕ αw (N, v) . Indeed, the induction property implies that, at the SP E of the mechanism M − (α, w), the agents accept the offer made by the proposer at the first round, and their final equilibrium payoff is given by φ w j (S, b v α ), which corresponds to the value ϕ αw (N, v).
Similar to MP W b we can explicitly construct an SP E strategy profile that yields the value as an outcome.
We note that the weighted Shapley value for the case of positive externalities can be implemented as well by modifying the outsiders' stage in M − (α, w). The basic feature of the modification is that a rejection in that stage leads to a partition composing of singletons.
